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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of job displacement on access to employer-provided fringe benefits. We find 
that displacement is associated with lost access to all seven employer-provided benefits investigated. These 
losses increase the cost of displacement by 10% per year. 
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Job displacement, Health insurance, Fringe benefits 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates job displacement’s long-term effects on access to employer-provided health insurance 
and other fringe benefits using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Previous 
research typically focuses on the earnings effects of these exogenous job losses. The literature routinely finds 
that displaced workers experience large and persistent earnings losses relative to their non-displaced 
peers.2 These losses, however, provide a lower bound of the costs associated with this life event. Other studies 
document deleterious health effects of displacement and short-term losses in access to employer-provided 
health insurance.3 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we examine displacement’s long-term effect on the 
probability of having access to employer-provided health insurance, which none of the earlier literature has 
done. Second, we are the first to study job displacement’s long-term effect on the probability of having access to 
other employer-provided benefits including: life insurance, dental insurance, paid sick leave, paid vacation, 
employer-provided training, and retirement benefits. Third, we monetize this lost access to fringe benefits and 
compare this value to the estimated earnings losses. 
2. Data 
The data for this analysis come from the core representative sample of the NLSY79, which is a cohort-based 
panel of 6111 individuals aged 14–21 as of December 31, 1978. It is common in the displacement literature to 
focus on workers with significant attachment to the labor force. Thus, the analysis excludes never-employed 
individuals, career part-time workers (those averaging less than 30 hours per week over the panel), and non-
displaced individuals who were not employed during seven or more surveys since completing their schooling. 
We also exclude those who attritted before 1990, individuals who responded to fewer than 12 of the 22 surveys 
during our period of analysis (1979–2006), and respondents with missing information on education, Armed 
Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) scores, or age. 
Displacement is defined as an involuntary job loss due to a layoff or plant closure of a worker with at least three 
years of tenure on the lost job.4 The analysis follows a worker’s first displacement after the age of 24 because 
subsequent job losses may not be exogenous (Stevens, 1997). Therefore, individuals with less than three years 
of tenure at the time of their first job loss are not eligible to enter the displaced sample if they experience a 
subsequent job loss. These workers are removed from the analysis.5 Summary statistics on the 521 individuals in 
the displaced (i.e. treatment) sample and the 2705 individuals in the non-displaced (i.e. control) sample are 
in Table 1. Overall, the displaced and non-displaced samples are similar. However, displaced workers are more 
likely to be African American and less likely to be union members. They also have less education and lower AFQT 
scores. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by displacement status. 
 
Non-displaced Displaced 
Age 34.8 35.2 
Female 45.8 43.8 
African American 10.0 12.5 
Years of education 13.9 13.1 
AFQT percentile 54.5 46.2 
Years of firm tenure 8.4 7.8 
Union status 12.7 11.1 
Notes: For displaced workers, statistics are calculated during the year before separation. For the non-displaced 
group, all person–year observations when an individual is age 25+ and has three years firm-level tenure are 
used. All values are mean values. 
The employer-provided benefits data come from a series of annual questions in the NLSY79 about access to 
fringe benefits.6Table 2 presents summary statistics on earnings and the prevalence of these benefits for the 
displaced and non-displaced samples over the pre- and post-job loss periods.7 Average earnings and access to 
these employer-provided benefits are similar in the “pre-displacement” period. However, the groups experience 
different changes in earnings and in the availability of fringe benefits from the “pre-displacement” period to the 
“post-displacement” period. For fringe benefits, we generally observe decreasing availability among the 
displaced and increasing availability among the non-displaced. The difference-in-differences from these 
summary statistics suggest that displaced workers experience relative losses in fringe benefits ranging from 5–
12 percentage points. 













Real earnings    Health 
insurance 
   
Displaced 28,650 35,588 6,938 Displaced 0.786 0.755 −0.031 






Life insurance    Dental 
insurance 
   
Displaced 0.666 0.652 −0.014 Displaced 0.560 0.614 0.054 






Paid vacation    Paid sick time    
Displaced 0.817 0.749 −0.068 Displaced 0.601 0.531 −0.070 








   Employer 
training 
   
Displaced 0.600 0.612 0.012 Displaced 0.480 0.454 −0.026 






Notes: Entries for earnings are in 2006 dollars. Entries for fringe benefits indicate proportions. For displaced and 
non-displaced workers, the entries in the Pre-Displacement column use all pre-separation observations 
(including periods of non-employment). Similarly, entries in the Post-Displacement column use all post-
separation observations (including periods of non-employment). For the non-displaced group, the year of 
“displacement” corresponds to a randomly chosen year such that the distribution of “displacements” assigned 
to each year matches the distribution in the displaced sample. 
3. Methodology 
The empirical methodology follows past studies in the displacement literature and uses an event study 
framework to estimate displacement’s impact on various outcomes: 
(1) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽 +� 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
10
𝑘𝑘=−2 . 
Typically, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  equals the real labor earnings for individual i in year t. In this analysis, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  also equals a series of 
seven dummy variables, one for each of the employer-provided benefits, equaling one if individual 𝑖𝑖 in 
year 𝑡𝑡 has access to the benefit through their own employment. Eq. (1), which is estimated as a linear 
probability model for the benefit specifications, includes individual fixed-effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖), a set of year dummy 
variables (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖), and a quadratic in age (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Finally, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  is a series of dummy variables equaling one if 
individual 𝑖𝑖 experiences a displacement in year 𝑡𝑡, where 𝑘𝑘 indexes these variables from two years before job loss 
to ten years afterward. The results focus on even-numbered post-displacement years because the NLSY79 
became a biennial survey in 1994. Therefore, anyone displaced from 1994 onwards is only observed in even-
numbered post-displacement years. Additionally, individuals displaced in odd years just prior to 1994 are only 
observed in odd-numbered post-displacement years. For example, someone displaced in 1993 is not observed in 
the second year after job loss (1995), but is observed in the first year after job loss (1994), the third year after 
job loss (1996), etc. To maximize sample sizes in the even years, we assign these odd-year post-separation 
observations to even years when even post-displacement periods are missing. Continuing with the above 
example of an individual displaced in 1993, 1994 becomes the second year after displacement, 1996 becomes 
the fourth year after displacement, etc.8 
4. Results 
Table 3 presents results from Eq. (1). These results include the effects of periods of non-employment, which are 
common after displacement. However, the results are very similar if we exclude observations during periods of 
non-employment or very low earnings (see Table A.2 in Appendix). Therefore, the estimates largely reflect the 
conditions at new jobs following displacement. 
Table 3. Displacement’s impact on earnings and employer-provided benefits.  
Real earnings Health 
insurance 










2 years before −2806 0.024 0.027 0.022 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.044⁎⁎ −0.013 −0.011  
(2214) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Year of −13,360⁎⁎⁎ −0.151⁎⁎⁎ −0.167⁎⁎⁎ −0.123⁎⁎⁎ −0.165⁎⁎⁎ −0.088⁎⁎⁎ −0.139⁎⁎⁎ −0.104⁎⁎⁎  
(1853) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
2 years after −10,990⁎⁎⁎ −0.073⁎⁎⁎ −0.099⁎⁎⁎ −0.043 −0.085⁎⁎⁎ −0.047⁎ −0.057⁎ −0.092⁎⁎⁎  
(1504) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
4 years after −12,378⁎⁎⁎ −0.114⁎⁎⁎ −0.120⁎⁎⁎ −0.069⁎⁎ −0.094⁎⁎⁎ −0.050 −0.066⁎⁎ −0.047  
(2369) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
6 years after −10,345⁎⁎⁎ −0.104⁎⁎⁎ −0.087⁎⁎⁎ −0.047 −0.055⁎⁎ −0.099⁎⁎⁎ −0.064⁎ −0.038  
(2540) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
8 years after −12,810⁎⁎⁎ −0.132⁎⁎⁎ −0.111⁎⁎⁎ −0.051 −0.052⁎⁎ −0.024 −0.045 −0.060⁎  
(3132) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
10 years after −11,538⁎⁎⁎ −0.133⁎⁎⁎ −0.116⁎⁎⁎ −0.074⁎⁎ −0.083⁎⁎⁎ −0.057 −0.090⁎⁎ −0.064⁎  
(2740) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
R2 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
N 57,816 50,532 50,105 42,933 49,678 41,455 35,128 34,878 
Notes: All regressions control for individual fixed effects and include a quadratic in age and dummy variables for calendar year as additional independent 




We find that displacement is associated with large and persistent declines in the availability of employer-
provided health insurance, life insurance, and paid vacation. The estimates show that in the immediate period 
following displacement, the probability that a worker has access to these benefits through their employer 
declines by 15–17 percentage points. These reduced probabilities persist and remain 8–13 percentage points 
below their non-displaced counterparts even ten years after job loss. 
Displacement also affects the probability that workers have access to employer-provided dental insurance, paid 
sick time, retirement benefits, and employer-provided training, which includes tuition reimbursement. The 
estimated losses of these benefits tend to be smaller in the short-run, ranging from 9–14 percentage points, and 
less persistent than the losses of health- and life insurance. However, the lost access to retirement benefits, 
employer-provided training, and dental insurance are relatively persistent. Displaced workers are 6–9 
percentage points less likely to have access to these benefits through their employer even ten years after 
displacement. 
The remainder of the paper monetizes these losses in access to employer-provided benefits. Table 4 presents 
estimates of the average employer costs of offering these fringe benefits to each employee in 2006.9 The hourly 
cost of offering each benefit is calculated by dividing the average cost per-worker by the share of workers 
eligible to receive the benefit. Data to calculate the cost of offering each benefit (except employer-provided 
training) come from the Employer Cost of Employee Compensation (ECEC) quarterly reports and the Employee 
Benefits for Private Industry 2006 report, both of which are administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
and based upon the National Compensation Survey.10 The data on the cost of employer training come from the 
BLS’ 1995 Survey of Employer-Provided Training.11 










Paid sick time Retirement 
benefits 
 Employer 






Average hourly cost per 
employee 
$1.87 $0.05 $0.18 $0.89 $0.29 $0.74 $0.44 $0.21 
Share of employees 
eligible 
71% 53% 46% 77% 57% 21% 54% 84% 
Hourly cost per eligible 
employee 
$2.64 $0.09 $0.39 $1.16 $0.51 $3.50 $0.81 $0.25 
Yearly cost per eligible 
employee 
$5280 $189 $781 $2312 $1018 $3127  $494 
Combined fringe benefit 
costs 
    $13,200    
Notes: Data on the average cost per employee for health insurance, life insurance, dental insurance, paid sick time, paid vacation, and retirement 
benefits come from the 2006 National Compensation Survey (NCS) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These per hour costs are each presented 
quarterly in the Employer Cost for Employee Compensation (ECEC) news releases. However, the cost of health insurance is calculated to be 90% of the 
cost of health benefits and the cost of dental insurance is calculated to be 8.6% of the costs of health benefits because the health benefits figures in the 
ECEC include medical, dental, and vision insurance. This percentage breakdown follows the work of Lettau (2004). All entries are for the civilian 
workforce in all occupations. The values for the share of eligible employees come from the Employee Benefits in Private Industry report 2006. Data on 
the cost and share eligible for employer training come from the BLS report on Employer-Provided Formal Training in 1995. The dollar values in that 
report refer to employer spending per employee in 1994. Dollar amounts were converted to 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers. Yearly totals assume employees work 2000 hours. For the yearly total cost for retirement benefits, we assumed 21/75=28% of eligibles 
received the defined benefit retirement plan and 54/75=72% received the defined contribution plan. 
Multiplying the yearly dollar amounts from Table 4 by the appropriate parameter estimates from Table 3 provides an approximate dollar value to the 
losses of employer-provided benefits. The results are presented in Table 5 and show that the average annual value of lost fringe benefits equals $1238. 
Since the average post-displacement earnings loss equals $11,903, these lost fringe benefits increase the annual costs of displacement, over and above 
the estimated earnings losses, by an average of 10.4%. 






















increase in total 
loss 
Year of 13,360 797 32 96 381 90 435 51 1882 14.1% 
2 years after 10,990 385 19 34 196 48 178 45 906 8.2% 
4 years after 12,378 602 23 54 217 51 206 23 1176 9.5% 
6 years after 10,345 549 16 37 127 101 200 19 1049 10.1% 
8 years after 12,810 697 21 40 120 24 141 30 1073 8.4% 
10 years after 11,538 702 22 58 192 58 281 32 1345 11.7% 
Notes: Implied dollar losses of various employer-provided benefits are calculated by multiplying the coefficients from the regression results presented 
in Table 3 by the appropriate yearly totals from Table 4. All costs are in 2006 dollars. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Using data from the NLSY79, this paper investigates the long-term effects of worker displacement on access to 
employer-provided benefits (through one’s own employment). The results demonstrate that involuntary job loss 
has a persistent, negative effect on the probability of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance, life 
insurance, and paid vacation. Displacement also reduces the likelihood of receiving dental insurance, paid sick 
time, retirement benefits, and employer-provided training for at least the first few years following separation. 
These lost fringe benefits impose additional, non-trivial costs to displaced workers that amount to a 10% 
increase over and above the estimated earnings losses. However, these cost estimates likely understate the 
realized costs to displaced workers for at least three reasons. First, worker displacement is associated with 
increased morbidity and mortality rates. Thus, lost employer-sponsored health insurance, dental insurance, and 
paid sick time may contribute directly to these documented health problems. Second, reductions in the 
probability of receiving formal training may contribute to the persistent earnings losses. Finally, the costs 
associated with these lost benefits are based upon the cost to the employer; however, the costs to the 
employee may be significantly larger. This is especially true for health insurance and other insurance products 
due to adverse selection. This may also be true for retirement plans. In a defined benefit program, displacement 
will be more costly to individuals because vesting often takes many years and the benefit is based upon one’s 
highest earnings. Additionally, in a defined contribution program, several years of lost contributions could add 
up to even greater losses at retirement due to compounding. Thus, these cost estimates associated with lost 
access to employer-provided fringe benefits may reasonably be thought of as a lower bound. 
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Appendix. 
See Table A.1, Table A.2. 
Table A.1. Description of NLSY79 fringe benefit variables. 
Fringe benefit NLSY79 question Years asked 
Health insurance Does your employer make medical, surgical, or hospital insurance 
that covers injuries or major illnesses off the job available to you? 
1979–2006 
Life insurance Does your employer make life insurance that would cover your 
death for reasons not connected to your job available to you? 
1979–2006 
Paid vacation Does your employer make paid vacation available to you? 1979–2006 
Dental insurance Does your employer make dental benefits available to you? 1985–2006 
Paid sick time Does your employer make sick days with full pay available to you? 1985–2006 
Training Does your employer make training or educational opportunities 
including tuition reimbursement available to you? 
1988–2006 
Retirement benefits Does your employer make a retirement plan other than social 
security available to you? 
1988–2006 
Note: Beginning in 1994, the NLSY79 began asking these questions for up to 5 jobs. To keep things consistent 
with the earlier period, we simply focused on the response to the primary (#1) job. No fringe benefit questions 
were asked in 1981. Fringe benefit questions continued to be asked after 2006. However, the data in this 
analysis does not extend beyond 2006. 




















−2674 −0.008 0.000 −0.002 0.022⁎ 0.025 −0.037 −0.033 
 
(2073) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Year of −11,836⁎⁎⁎ −0.103⁎⁎⁎ −0.119⁎⁎⁎ −0.101⁎⁎⁎ −0.122⁎⁎⁎ −0.050⁎ −0.105⁎⁎⁎ −0.089⁎⁎⁎  
(2183) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
2 years 
after 
−10,410⁎⁎⁎ −0.042⁎⁎ −0.075⁎⁎⁎ −0.020 −0.053⁎⁎⁎ −0.030 −0.037 −0.074⁎⁎ 
 
(1657) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
4 years 
after 
−11,388⁎⁎⁎ −0.094⁎⁎⁎ −0.105⁎⁎⁎ −0.070⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.036 −0.043 −0.024 
 
(2188) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
6 years 
after 
−10,104⁎⁎⁎ −0.087⁎⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.042 −0.025 −0.095⁎⁎⁎ −0.052 −0.024 
 
(2919) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
8 years 
after 
−12,297⁎⁎⁎ −0.124⁎⁎⁎ −0.108⁎⁎⁎ −0.040 −0.037 −0.019 −0.048 −0.050 
 




−10,492⁎⁎⁎ −0.122⁎⁎⁎ −0.122⁎⁎⁎ −0.075⁎⁎ −0.060⁎⁎ −0.044 −0.103⁎⁎ −0.056 
 
(3104) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 
N 50,225 44,393 43,979 38,060 43,557 36,604 31,871 31,611 
Notes: All regressions control for individual fixed effects and include a quadratic in age and dummy variables for 
calendar year as additional independent variables. Standard errors, which are clustered at the individual level, 
are shown in parentheses. Real earnings losses are in 2006 dollars. This alternate sample excludes all periods of 
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